




A was aware that organisms have parts and organs that
are well suited to exercising their distinctive vital capacities, such
as their capacities for locomotion, reproduction, self-maintenance,
and perception. The presence of those well-suited parts and organs
is, Aristotle thinks, no accident. These parts are present for the sake
of those vital activities and functions they are used to perform:
Since every instrument is for the sake of something, and each of the parts
of the body is for the sake of something, and what they are for the sake of is
a certain action, it is apparent that the entire body too has been constituted
for the sake of a certain complete action. For sawing is not for the sake of
the saw but the saw for sawing; for sawing is a certain use. So the body too
is in a way for the sake of the soul, and the parts are for the sake of the
functions in relation to which each of them has naturally developed. (PA
. , b–, trans. Lennox)
Aristotle was also aware that organisms have, by and large, parts
and organs that are well suited to life in a certain kind of habitat.
(By ‘habitat’ I mean an ecological environment characterized both
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 I am oversimplifying matters here in speaking as though an organism has only
a single habitat, since Aristotle distinguishes several respects in which something
might be, for example, a water-, marsh-, or land-dweller. As Aristotle discusses in
HA  (). , an animal might be a water-dweller with respect to feeding, but a land-
dweller with respect to cooling, for instance. This becomes relevant for Aristotle
when he is discussing (e.g. in PA . ) kinds that ‘tend to both sides’—ones that
have one habitat for certain vital activities and a diﬀerent habitat for others. My
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by abiotic features such as moisture, light, and temperature, and by
biotic ones, such as the availability of certain kinds of plants and ani-
mals as food or shelter, or the presence of predators or rivals.) His
biological works contain numerous references to the co-ordination
between the parts or organs that a kind of organism uses to exer-
cise its vital capacities, and the conditions in the habitat in which
it does so. For instance, he notes that the hard lining of the camel’s
mouth allows it to consume the type of vegetation—viz. thorny cac-
tus plants—that grow in the deserts where the camel lives (PA . ,
a–b), that the ﬂat beak of certain marsh birds is useful for
digging up roots in the mud (PA . , a ﬀ.), and that birds
that live near water can swim more easily because of the webbing
between their toes (PA . , b ﬀ.). Reﬂection on these facts
quite naturally leads us to ask what accounts for the ﬁt between
these organisms and their habitats. I will call such a question a
‘question of ﬁt’. But Aristotle, despite his awareness of those same
facts, never asks any such question.
discussion of habitat is consistent with this complication, and so for the most part
I will overlook it. (For discussions of these kinds, which are sometimes called (per-
haps misleadingly) ‘dualizers’, see D. M. Balme, ‘Aristotle’s Use of Division and
Diﬀerentiae’, in A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Aris-
totle’s Biology [Issues] (Cambridge, ), –; A. Gotthelf, ‘First Principles in
Aristotle’s Parts of Animals’ [‘First Principles’], in Gotthelf and Lennox (eds.), Is-
sues, –, repr. in A. Gotthelf, Teleology, First Principles, and Scientiﬁc Method
in Aristotle’s Biology [Teleology] (Oxford, ), –; J. G. Lennox, ‘Divide and
Explain: The Posterior Analytics in Practice’, in Gotthelf and Lennox (eds.), Issues,
–, repr. in J. G. Lennox,Aristotle’s Philosophy of Biology: Studies in the Origins
of Life Science [Biology] (Cambridge, ), –; J. G. Lennox, ‘Bios and Expla-
natory Unity in Aristotle’s Biology’ [‘Bios’], in D. Charles (ed.), Deﬁnition in Greek
Philosophy (Oxford, ), –; J. G. Lennox, ‘Βίος, Πρᾶξις, and the Unity of
Life’ [‘Πρᾶξις’], in S. Föllinger (ed.),Was ist ‘Leben’? Aristoteles’ Anschauungen zur
Entstehung und Funktionsweise von Leben. Akten der Tagung vom .–. August 
in Bamberg (Stuttgart, ), –.)
 Asking what accounts for the ﬁt between organisms and their habitats is not the
same as asking why organisms are found in habitats to which they are well suited.
Questions of ﬁt are questions of the form ‘Why are ﬁsh so well suited to life in wa-
ter?’, rather than ‘Why are ﬁsh found in water?’. Call questions of this latter sort
‘distribution questions’. One way to see that these questions are distinct is by noting
that one could answer all of the questions of ﬁt and yet still not have an answer to
distribution questions: we could understand why there is a ﬁt between ﬁsh and wa-
ter, but still wonder why it is that ﬁsh are actually living in water, rather than eking
out their existence in some less than ideal circumstances. I suspect that the tendency
to conﬂate these two questions is in part explained by the fact that we usually answer
both questions by appeals to an organism’s evolutionary history. Although Aristotle
does not ask either of these sorts of question, my focus here is only on why he does
not raise questions of ﬁt.
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It is unlikely that Aristotle thinks this ‘ﬁt’ (as I am calling it)
between organisms and their habitats is merely a lucky coincidence.
InPhysics .  he rejects the idea that regularly occurring, beneﬁcial
arrangements of parts within the body—such as our teeth being ar-
ranged suitably for biting and grinding food—could be merely due
to chance. So, it is natural to expect that Aristotle would consider
the beneﬁcial co-ordination between organisms and their habitats
to be equally non-accidental. The co-ordination between the parts
of the body is not suﬃcient to explain the survival and ﬂourishing
of a kind; if the kind does not have a co-operative habitat, having
teeth that are suitable for biting and grinding, for example, would
be of little use.
Darwinians and Creationists have ready explanations. The
former can tell an evolutionary story about how organisms evolved
to be the way they are; the latter can appeal to an Intelligent
Designer’s grand plans for producing such a good ﬁt. On the as-
sumption that Aristotle is neither a Darwinian nor a Creationist,
however, these answers are not available to him.
In what follows I will ﬁrst consider two possible strategies for
reconstructing Aristotle’s answer to questions of ﬁt. The ﬁrst is
going to appeal to a global or cosmic version of natural teleology.
The second will give the conditions in various habitats an eﬃcient-
causal role in shaping the character of the organisms living in them.
Neither of these approaches, as I will argue, provides an attractive
answer.
What I will propose instead is a way of understanding Aristotle’s
views about the essences of living substances, i.e. the ‘what-it-is-
to-be’ for living creatures, that explains why he would not ask any
questions of ﬁt. In short, my proposal will be that habitat is par-
tially constitutive of the vital capacities that comprise a kind’s es-
sence. Consequently, whereas we might think that questions of ﬁt
are urgent, for Aristotle those questions would not arise. For, just
as asking why swimming takes place in water evinces some con-
fusion about what swimming is, Aristotle would think that ask-
ing a question of ﬁt betrays a misunderstanding about what the
objects of natural science are. Swimming is a kind of movement
that takes place—essentially—in water. So, too, all of an organism’s
psychic capacities are ones that take place—essentially—in certain
types of environment. The various activities that comprise the life
of a kind of organism cannot even be speciﬁed without referring
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to the habitats in which those activities are performed. The way
of thinking about the essences of living kinds that I will attribute
to Aristotle yields a richer and more nuanced view about natural
substances than the abstract and programmatic discussions in the
Physics suggest.
. Global teleology
One approach to answering questions of ﬁt is to readAristotle as en-
dorsing a ‘cosmic’ or ‘global’ version of natural teleology in the way
advocated by David Sedley. On Sedley’s view, the beneﬁcial co-
ordination between organisms and their habitats is to be explained
teleologically. The conditions that make life possible—especially
human life—are such as they are for the sake of doing just that:
Clearly the world as a whole is structured in many ways that are regularly
beneﬁcial to life, including the availability of natural resources, and the
eternally recurrent intertransformation of the four simple bodies that un-
derlies the weather cycle, this latter dependent in turn on the daily and an-
nual cycles of the sun. If Aristotle conceded that these advantageous cosmic
structures require no teleological explanation, he would be playing into the
hands of his opponents by implying that advantageous structures in indi-
vidual organisms might equally well be understood as nonpurposive.
Although Sedley’s interpretation is subtler and more complicated
than I can do justice to here, I take the crux of it to be the fol-
lowing. In Sedley’s view, Aristotle holds that goal directedness in
 It will simply be false, pace S. Waterlow, to say that Aristotle thinks the condi-
tions in a certain habitat merely ‘provide the stage’ (S. Waterlow, Nature, Change,
and Agency in Aristotle’s Physics [Nature] (Oxford, ), ) or ‘arena’ (ibid. ) in
which an individual substance’s activities are carried out, or that Aristotle does not
consider positive descriptions of those conditions important to understanding the
natures of living organisms (ibid. ).
 See D. Sedley, ‘Is Aristotle’s Teleology Anthropocentric?’ [‘Anthropocentric’],
Phronesis,  (), –; ‘Metaphysics Λ’, in D. Charles and M. Frede (eds.),
Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ: Proceedings of the Fourteenth Symposium Aristotelicum
(Oxford, ), –;Creationism and its Critics in Antiquity [Creationism] (Berke-
ley, ); and ‘Teleology, Aristotelian and Platonic’, in J. G. Lennox and R. Bolton
(eds.), Being, Nature, and Life in Aristotle: Essays in Honor of Allan Gotthelf (Cam-
bridge, ), –.
 Sedley, Creationism, .
 I am glossing over, in particular, the anthropocentric aspect of Sedley’s interpre-
tation: ‘Nature is anthropocentric to the extent that man is the ultimate beneﬁciary,
while god remains the ultimate object of aspiration, that which all lesser beings strive
to imitate’ (Sedley, ‘Anthropocentric’, ). On Sedley’s interpretation, all natural
Created on 26 February 2015 at 21.24 hours page 270
Aristotle on Essence and Habitat 
nature extends beyond the development and characteristic beha-
viours of individual substances and to the cosmos considered as a
whole. Not only the reproduction and maintenance of individual
living beings, but also the motions of celestial bodies, the cycles of
elemental transformation, and sublunary weather patterns are goal-
directed processes.
The shared goal of all these natural phenomena, furthermore, is
the emulation of the UnmovedMover’s perfect activity, which each
thing does in its own way. A living organism emulates divine actu-
ality by reproducing another like itself. The elements do this by
continual, cyclical transformation into each other.
It is important to note that on Sedley’s interpretation, moreover,
it is not merely the shared striving to emulate god’s perfect actuality
that ensures and so explains that good order will obtain among all
the parts of the cosmos.After all, the fact that theUnmovedMover
serves as the ‘metaphysical magnet’ drawing all things towards it
is surely compatible with a lack of co-ordination. In order for that
shared goal to be providing a genuine explanation, there needs to
be some connection between the single, common aim and the co-
ordination and ﬁt between natural entities. Without such a connec-
tion, there is nothing that guarantees that order will emerge. Sedley
forges a link, onAristotle’s behalf, between each natural entity’s aim
to emulate god’s perfect actuality and their mutual co-ordination
(including organisms’ ﬁt with their habitats) by positing a ‘cosmic
phenomena ultimately aim to emulate god’s perfection, but natural phenomena are
for the sake of humans—the highest species—in the sense that they beneﬁt humans.
(For the distinction between aim and beneﬁciary see DA . , a–b, b–;
Phys. . , a–;Metaph. Λ , b–.)
 Cf. GA . , b–a; DA . , a ﬀ.
 GC . , a ﬀ.;Meteor. . , b ﬀ.
 The idea that a shared aim gives rise to co-ordination is expressed by I. Bodnár,
who writes that ‘Aristotle submits that there is a joint-arrangement, that every single
entity is jointly arranged in relation to all the others and that this joint-arrangement
arises due to the fact that each of these entities is related to the single entity at the
pinnacle of this arrangement’ (I. Bodnár, ‘Teleology across Natures’ [‘Teleology’],
Rhizai,  (), – at ). Similarly, M. Leunissen claims that in Aristotle’s view,
the ‘goodness, order, and joint arrangement of the cosmos as a whole emerge from the
goal-directed actions of the individual parts of the cosmos towards the same end, the
UnmovedMover’ (M. Leunissen, Explanation and Teleology in Aristotle’s Science of
Nature [Explanation] (Cambridge, ), ).
 This phrase is borrowed from C. Kahn, ‘The Place of the Prime Mover in
Aristotle’s Teleology’, in A. Gotthelf (ed.), Aristotle on Nature and Living Things
[Nature] (Pittsburgh, ), – at .
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nature’, over and above the individual natures. On Sedley’s inter-
pretation, every part of the cosmos strives to emulate god’s perfect
activity. This striving by any given part of nature, however, does
not take place in a vacuum, but within a larger system. The larger
system of which each is a part constrains or determines what the
best possible emulation of god’s perfect activity consists in, just as
an organism’s entire body constrains what optimal functioning of
any particular part of it will involve. So, for instance, the lung is
an organ for cooling. But how that cooling function is best carried
out is in large part dependent upon what the other body parts are
like. Optimal cooling is not necessarily the highest degree of cool-
ing; what is optimal depends on factors such as the degree of heat
in an organism’s heart. So too, what the best possible emulation of
god’s perfection can be for any part of nature is determined by its
place in the universe as a whole.
Sedley’s proposal, then, is that the whole universe is analogous
to an individual organism. Like an individual organism, the uni-
verse has a nature, over and above the individual natures. And this
‘cosmic nature’ co-ordinates its parts such that each part is able to
emulate god’s perfect activity in the best possible way:
Just as the nature of an animal can be invoked to explain why it has the
parts that it does, including some that are at the service of others, so too the
nature of the world, including the sublunary realm’s complex goal-directed
structure with man at its apex, can be invoked to explain why it contains
the species, weather-systems, and other amenities that it does.
What this interpretationmakes room for is an explanation of the co-
ordination between organisms and their habitats. Given that each
part of nature is striving to imitate god’s perfection, and that what
such imitating involves depends on its place in the cosmos, it will
turn out that the co-ordination between organisms and their habi-
tats is simply a permanent feature of the well-ordered world, just
 Sedley, Creationism, . Sedley’s evidence for his interpretation is primarily
the analogy drawn in Metaph. Λ , a–, between the universe and armies
(and households), where the ‘joint-arrangement’ of the components appears to be
explained by their being ‘jointly arranged in relation to one thing’. Although Aris-
totle does not say as much explicitly, we can imagine that the soldiers in an army
are arranged in relation to each other—there is beneﬁcial co-ordination among their
actions—in virtue of their sharing the same goal, perhaps obeying the orders of the
general. For discussions of Sedley’s treatment of this passage see Bodnár, ‘Teleo-
logy’, –, and R. Wardy, ‘Aristotelian Rainfall or the Lore of Averages’ [‘Rain-
fall’], Phronesis,  (), – at –.
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as the ‘teleological functioning of the parts of the body constitutes
a permanent symbiotic interrelation’.
An interpretation of Aristotle’s teleology such as Sedley’s may
provide an answer, for Aristotle, to questions of ﬁt. But there are
reasons to wonder whether this is really Aristotle’s view. There is,
as Sedley’s critics have pointed out, at least a prima facie tension
between the idea that there is a cosmic nature, analogous to the
natures of individual living beings, and Aristotle’s metaphysics of
substance. Aristotle says in the Physics that only substances have
natures (b–). So, if the cosmos is to have a nature, it must be
a substance, which seems to imply that the inhabitants of the cos-
mos are parts of that substance. But Aristotle also appears to think
that parts of substances are not substances, or at least are only sub-
stances in potential (Metaph. Ζ , b ﬀ.). If so, this threatens
the status of living things—given that they are parts of the cosmos—
as paradigmatic substances (cf. Metaph. Ζ , a; Ζ , a;
Η , b–).
Sedley’s interpretation has also been criticized for its rejection
of what has been called Aristotle’s ‘teleological axiom’ that ‘nature
does what is best among the possibilities for the animal’s own be-
ing’.Aristotle’s reference to the ﬁnal cause inPhysics . , b–,
as being what is ‘better thus, not simply, but in relation to the be-
ing of each thing’, is taken by many scholars as explicitly restricting
the scope of goal-directed natural processes to those that beneﬁt the
same natural entity as that which undergoes the process.Although
there are ways of reading Aristotle’s claim in Physics .  that are
amenable to Sedley’s view, Aristotle’s practices in his biological
works—where there are very few passages that do not clearly con-
 Sedley, ‘Anthropocentric’, .
 See Wardy, ‘Rainfall’, and Bodnár, ‘Teleology’, for objections to the existence
of a cosmic nature in Aristotle’s ontology.
 J. G. Lennox, Aristotle: On the Parts of Animals I–IV. Translated with an
Introduction and Commentary [Parts] (Oxford, ), .
 See L. Judson, ‘Aristotelian Teleology’ [‘Aristotelian’], Oxford Studies in An-
cient Philosophy,  (), – at –, and Lennox, Parts, . D. M. Balme
claims that Aristotle’s statement in Physics .  ‘cannot be reconciled’ with global te-
leology (Aristotle: De partibus animalium I and De generatione animalium I (with
Passages from II. –). Translated with Notes, with a Report on Recent Work and an
Additional Bibliography [De partibus] (Oxford, ), ). Aristotle makes similar
remarks at IA , b–, and GA . , b–.
 Sedley suggests that the contrast intended between better ‘simply’ and better
‘in relation to each being’ is that between being better relative to some being or other
and being better ‘absolutely’, and takes Aristotle to be denying Plato’s view in the
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form to that ‘axiom’—is thought to tell against such an alternative
reading.
I will add to the list of worries the fact that Aristotle does not
seem to oﬀer any argument for the existence of a cosmic nature.
As I understand it, Aristotle’s argument for positing goal-directed
natures that co-ordinate the parts of individual organisms relies
heavily on observations of the regularity with which these beneﬁ-
cial structures are produced. In an eternal, ungenerated universe
there is no analogous reproductive regularity to be observed. Con-
sequently, the same kind of argument as he gives for goal-directed
individual natures cannot be applied in the case of a cosmic nature.
It might be Aristotle’s view that the whole universe has a nature like
the natures of individual organisms, and that this cosmic nature is
responsible for the beneﬁcial distribution of organisms in suitable
habitats. If that is his view, however, it is one for which he does not
appear to give an argument. And this is surprising, given that he
clearly sees the need to argue against those who deny that there are
individual, goal-directed natures.
These criticisms of Sedley’s interpretation are not decisive. How-
ever, in the light of the fact that his interpretation requires quite
Timaeus that features of the world can be intrinsically good, and ‘not because they
do anyone any good’ (‘Anthropocentric’, ).
 As M. Leunissen interprets Aristotle, this teleological axiom applies only to
cases of what she calls ‘primary teleology’, but not to what she calls ‘secondary te-
leology’. On her interpretation, cases of secondary teleology are cases of ‘any agent—
internal or external—making use of things available by nature for its own good, such
as living beings using each other as food’ (Explanation, ). This distinction might
provide a way to read various comments (such as that at PA . , b ﬀ., where
Aristotle claims that the placement of the dolphin’s mouth is for the sake of pre-
serving other animals) in a way that does not conﬂict with the teleological axiom,
since one can maintain that these are cases of secondary teleology, and the axiom
applies only to primary teleology. Unfortunately, however, I do not think appeal-
ing to secondary teleology will provide a satisfying answer to questions of ﬁt. For
the answer would be that the habitat is for the sake of the kind—though only in the
secondary way—in that ‘the formal nature of one natural being appropriates the po-
tentials available in another natural being in order to use it for its own beneﬁt’ (ibid.
). That is, the sense in which the habitat is for the sake of the organisms is that the
habitat gets used by or is useful for organisms. However, since questions of ﬁt are
questions about why a habitat is useful for an organism, such an answer would seem
merely to restate the explanandum.
 For a discussion of the relevance of regular reproduction from seed in Aris-
totle’s argument for natural teleology see A. Code, ‘The Priority of Final Causes
over Eﬃcient Causes in Aristotle’s PA’, in W. Kullmann and S. Föllinger (eds.),
Aristotelische Biologie: Intentionen,Methoden, Ergebnisse [Biologie] (Stuttgart, ),
–.
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controversial assumptions, a proposal for how Aristotle would an-
swer questions of ﬁt that presupposes it is not appealing.
. Adaptation
Sometimes Aristotle speaks about an organism’s habitat in a way
that strongly suggests a causal and explanatory account running
from facts about a habitat to facts about an organism’s parts and
features. In PA . , for instance, he says that ‘Some birds are
long-legged. The cause [aition] of this is their marsh-dweller way of
life’ (b). Comments such as this indicate that Aristotle thinks
there is a causal account proceeding from facts about the habitat to
facts about the body parts and features of the living organisms in it.
As is well known, Aristotle thinks there are four ways of being a
cause, so there is a question about which he means to be referring
to here. If one were tempted to read this as signalling an eﬃcient-
causal account, as opposed to a formal- or ﬁnal-causal one, fur-
ther support might be garnered from the fact that there are other
passages in which an eﬃcient-causal role is given to environmental
conditions such as climate. For example,GA .  contains a descrip-
tion of the way variations in hair thickness result from diﬀerences
in the temperature and humidity of a given region. The reason or-
ganisms have hair at all is protection, but how thick or thin, straight
or curly the hair is depends on factors such as the amount of heat
and ﬂuidity present while it is forming. So, for example, Scythians
and Thracians have straight hair, in part because the surrounding
air is moist, whereas those who live in hot and dry regions such as
Ethiopia have curly hair (b–a). And inGA .  facts about
climate and a region’s water are said to play a role in determining
the sex of an embryo (a–). In addition, Mariska Leunissen
has recently argued that Aristotle holds a version of what she calls
‘environmental determinism’ about the development of character.
Leunissen argues that in Aristotle’s view, an organism’s ethos or na-
tural character—its being timid, mild, courageous, gentle, intelli-
 The interpretation that I will be arguing for is, in fact, compatible with Sed-
ley’s, but it does not require it.
 I will argue that this should be read as a teleological explanation.
 M. Leunissen, ‘Aristotle on Natural Character and its Implications for Moral
Development’ [‘Character’], Journal of the History of Philosophy,  (), –
at .
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gent, or stupid—is causally determined by ‘external environmental
factors’.
So, in certain cases, Aristotle may hold that an organism’s fea-
tures are eﬃcient-causal eﬀects of conditions in its environment.
Those cases, however, are importantly diﬀerent from the ones I
am concerned with here. In each of those examples just mentioned,
there is a material-eﬃcient causal account that goes from envir-
onmental factors, by way of the organism’s elemental composi-
tion or bodily ‘blend’ (krasis), to some characteristic or feature.
Here the environment is thought to inﬂuence the outcome via its
causal inﬂuence on the quality of the material constitution of an
organism. Questions of ﬁt, however, are about the co-ordination
between habitat and the parts that are suited to performing their
functions in those habitats, and it is doubtful that a similar eﬃcient-
causal account can be given for those.
There are at least three reasons for this doubt. First, Aristotle
gives no indication that he thinks that a causal story going from
the eﬀects of climate on the organism’s bodily blend to the orga-
nism’s part or feature could be told about the long legs of themarsh-
dweller bird. It is equally unclear that he thinks that this could be
the case for the ﬂat beaks of the swamp-dweller, vegetarian birds
(PA . , a ﬀ.) and the webbed feet of the aquatic birds (PA
. , b ﬀ.), or the hard roof of the mouth and multiple sto-
machs of the thorny-food-eating camel (PA . , a–b). Un-
like, for example, hair thickness, there is no attempt on Aristotle’s
part to explain how temperature and humidity give rise to variations
in the shapes and structures of these sorts of parts or organs. At least
in the case of hair thickness, Aristotle appeals to rates of evaporation
and amounts and qualities of moisture being evaporated. Second,
even if there were some way to tell such a story, it would need to
include the environment’s eﬃcient-casual eﬀect on the organisms’
activities and functions. For Aristotle thinks that the character of
the function that a part is used to perform is explanatorily prior to
 Leunissen argues that an organism’s natural character depends on its elemental
‘blend’, which blend is in turn ‘changeable by eﬃcient-causal changes due to aging
and disease, diet, and external environmental factors’ (‘Character’, ). Leunissen
cites Pol. . , b–, as evidence that Aristotle thinks the natural character
traits of an individual human ‘depend on the climate where it lives’ (ibid.).
 See Lennox, ‘Bios’, – n. , for a discussion of the tight connection between
the ‘material constitution of the food source’ and an organism’s habitat. I am accept-
ing Lennox’s suggestion that references to nourishment be read as emphasizing the
habitat rather than the food.
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the character of the part. Third, this would not explain why an or-
ganism’s parts and activities should turn out to be suitable in those
conditions. That is, the fact that some part of an animal is a result
of certain eﬃcient-causal inﬂuences in no way guarantees that the
part will be beneﬁcial to the animal in the conditions that exert this
causal inﬂuence.
Is there some other way—that is, other than environmental in-
ﬂuence on the bodily blend—in which organisms’ features can be
considered as eﬀects of the conditions in their environments? Some
scholars claim that the sorts of examples just cited are instances of
adaptation by an organism to its environment. If we take ‘adapt’
simply to mean ‘change in response to the environment’, it seems
reasonable that Aristotle would think there are plenty of ways that
an organism can do this. There are, for instance, extended dis-
cussions of the ways diﬀerent kinds of organisms respond to sea-
sonal changes by hibernating (HA  (). –) and migrating (HA
 (). –).
There is, however, a limit to the kinds of change an individual or-
ganism’s nature could undergo in response to its environment. And
changes to an organism’s body parts that are needed to perform cer-
tain functions seem to lie well beyond that point. The problemwith
this idea is not merely the fact that it seems implausible to think that
an organism could grow longer legs in response to ﬁnding itself in
a marsh in the way it might go into hiding in response to a drop in
temperature, or that a bird could develop webbing between its toes
in response to living in water, just as it might ﬂy to warmer regions
when winter arrives.The problemwith this as an interpretation of
Aristotle is that changes such as those in the size, shape, or position
 Judson, ‘Aristotelian’,  n. ; Lennox, Parts, ; Leunissen, Explana-
tion, .
 Lamarck, after all, thought this was the case: ‘We ﬁnd in the same way that the
bird of the water-side which does not like swimming and yet is in need of going to
the water’s edge to secure its prey, is continually liable to sink in the mud. Now this
bird tries to act in such a way that its body should not be immersed in the liquid,
and hence makes its best eﬀorts to stretch and lengthen its legs . . .The bird which is
drawn to the water by its need of ﬁnding there the prey on which it lives, separates
the digits of its feet in trying to strike the water and move about on the surface. The
skin which unites these digits at their base acquires the habit of being stretched by
these continually repeated separations of the digits; thus in the course of time there
are formed large webs which unite the digits of ducks, geese, etc., as we actually ﬁnd
them. In the same way eﬀorts to swim, that is to push against the water so as to move
about in it, have stretched the membranes between the digits of frogs, sea-tortoises,
the otter, beaver, etc.’ (J. B. Lamarck, Zoological Philosophy: An Exposition with
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of body parts would require changes in the functions and activities
those parts are needed to perform: the functions and activities have,
in Aristotle’s view, causal and explanatory priority over the parts.
And, I submit, an organism cannot modify its essential vital activi-
ties within a single lifespan.
The idea that there can be adaptations of essential activities
would be reasonable, perhaps, given the assumption that species
evolve over time. If species evolve—if some species go out of ex-
istence and new species come to be—there is nothing obviously
incoherent about there being modiﬁcations to essential activities
and functions. Yet although there may be nothing in Aristotle’s
theory that is inconsistent with evolution, there is no evidence that
Aristotle does think species evolve. The consensus view, on the
contrary, is that Aristotle believes in the permanence and ﬁxity
of the species—that the world has always contained the kinds of
organisms it does—and that this would be the most reasonable
position to take, given the lack of palaeontological evidence in his
day. In order to accept that Aristotle’s answer to questions of ﬁt is
that ‘the kind adapted to its environment’, we must then be willing
to endorse the view that, according to Aristotle, species evolve.
However, since the latter view is unattractive, so consequently is
the former.
. Habitat and essence
So far, I have considered two possible, though problematic, answers
to questions of ﬁt. The ﬁrst answer requires the assumption that
Aristotle’s ontology includes an overall, cosmic nature. The second
answer is hard to square with Aristotle’s belief that functions are
prior to parts, as well as his views about the ﬁxity of kinds.
regard to the Natural History of Animals, translated, with an introduction by Hugh
Elliot (London, ), ).
 This does not mean that an organism will not behave diﬀerently in diﬀerent
circumstances. However, not all diﬀerences in behaviour are manifestations of dif-
ferences in vital capacities. I discuss this further below, in sect. .
 See e.g. J. Cooper, ‘Aristotle on Natural Teleology’, in M. Nussbaum and M.
Schoﬁeld (eds.), Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy Presented
to G. E. L. Owen (Cambridge, ), – at  ﬀ.; J. G. Lennox, ‘Kinds,
Forms of Kinds, and the More and the Less in Aristotle’s Biology’, in Gotthelf and
Lennox (eds.), Issues, – at , repr. in Lennox,Biology, – at ; Balme,
De partibus, –.
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Here I want to consider a diﬀerent, more promising strategy, one
that shows why questions of ﬁt are, in eﬀect, the wrong sort of ques-
tions to expect Aristotle to be asking, given his conception of living
substances. This strategy, in short, is to reconceive of the relation
between habitats and organisms. In my view, Aristotle considers
habitat to be partially constitutive of the capacities that comprise
a kind’s essence, and not merely an external or enabling condition
under which an organism can exercise its essential capacities. An
attractive feature of this interpretation is that it explains why Aris-
totle would not raise any questions of ﬁt: there is no need to ask why
an animal is well suited to the habitat in which it lives if its habitat
is already included in what it is to be an animal of that kind.
The idea that habitat is part of an organism’s essence, and that
habitat accordingly plays an explanatory role in scientiﬁc investiga-
tions about the kind, is not original withme. Long ago, for example,
Allan Gotthelf noted that the elephant’s being a marsh-dweller is
one of the ‘multiple essential features’ that Aristotle appeals to in his
complicated explanation of the elephant’s distinctive trunk. And
in recent papers Jim Lennox has pointed out that a kind’s ‘way of
life’ or bios—of which habitat is one important aspect—‘is occasion-
ally identiﬁed as a fundamental feature of its being; and particular
divisions of ways of life as general diﬀerentiae are likewise aspects
of the essence of forms of those kinds’.
As both Gotthelf and Lennox have pointed out, History of Ani-
mals and Parts of Animals contain frequent references to the envi-
ronment in which an organism performs various activities, such as
feeding or cooling, in a way that strongly suggests that performing
those activities in that habitat is, in Aristotle’s view, simply part of
the kind’s nature. On the basis of such references, it would appear
that Aristotle thinks that it is part of the being or essence of the kind
to perform those activities in certain habitats. And if this is, in fact,
how Aristotle is thinking about living substances and their habitats,
it is no surprise that he never explicitly raises any questions of ﬁt,
questions which seemed so pressing to later biologists and philoso-
phers such as Darwin.
 A. Gotthelf, ‘The Elephant’s Nose: Further Reﬂections on the Axiomatic
Structure of Biological Explanation in Aristotle’ [‘Elephant’], in Kullmann and
Föllinger (eds.), Biologie, – at , repr. in A. Gotthelf, Teleology, First Prin-
ciples, and Scientiﬁc Method in Aristotle’s Biology (Oxford, ), – at .
 Lennox, ‘Bios’, , and ‘Πρᾶξις’, .
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The general idea that a kind’s essence will include its habitat is
appealing, but the plausibility of this interpretation of Aristotle de-
pends on how it is developed in detail. One would hope that this
general idea could be made precise in a way consistent with Aris-
totle’s other views. In particular, since Aristotle appears to identify
an organism’s essence with its soul (DA . , b–)—its capa-
cities for engaging in vital activities—we need an account of how
habitat is related to those capacities comprising soul.
Gotthelf, unfortunately, does not address how the multiple
essential features appealed to in explanations are related to one
another. His focus is on examining the structure of those explana-
tions, with a view to showing that they do have, at least implicitly,
the sort of structure described in the Posterior Analytics. In parti-
cular, Gotthelf is interested in presenting evidence that Aristotle’s
biological writings consider certain features that are appealed to in
various explanations to be essential features that would be part of a
kind’s deﬁnition. Such features are what Gotthelf refers to as the
‘givens’, features of a kind that explain the presence or character
of its other features but that are not ‘explained anywhere else in
PA, and for each of which there is good theoretical or intuitive
reason to think that Aristotle considered them explanatorily basic
and thus essential to the subject kind’. Gotthelf claims that being
a marsh animal is among those unexplained explainers of the ele-
phant’s trunk, but does not say how that fact about the elephant
is related to its other essential features. As Gotthelf ’s concern in
 In Gotthelf ’s view, in fact, Aristotle in his biology considers many more fea-
tures than psychic functions to be part of the being or essence of a kind. Gotthelf
thinks that in addition to ‘standard soul-functions’, Aristotle includes in the οὐσία
certain body parts, ‘dimensional’ features such as, perhaps, size and shape of certain
limbs, and ‘the blend of material elements that constitutes the animal’ (A. Gotthelf,
‘Notes towards a Study of Substance and Essence in Aristotle’s Parts of Animals
ii–iv’ [‘Notes’], in Gotthelf (ed.), Nature, – at , repr. in Gotthelf, Teleology,
– at ). This, as Gotthelf says, puts pressure on ‘strongly functionalist in-
terpretations of Aristotelian form’ (‘Notes’, – n. =Teleology,  n. ).
 Gotthelf, ‘Elephant’,  (=Teleology, ). Gotthelf is at times more circum-
spect about whether references to a kind’s οὐσία are to be taken as references to its
essence or τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (see e.g. ‘Notes’,  n.  and  n. =Teleology, – n. 
and  n. .)  ‘Elephant’,  (=Teleology, ).
 Elsewhere Gotthelf entertains the idea that where an organism eats is not a
‘given’ but rather is explained by the kind of food it must eat (‘First Principles’,
–=Teleology, ). Although eating a sort of food might be a ‘given’, Aristotle
also appears to hold that organisms’ food must have ‘an elemental blend like their
own’ (ibid. =Teleology, ). This suggests toGotthelf that ‘the blend ofmaterial
elements makes it causally necessary that an animal feed in a certain place’ (‘Notes’,
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these papers is not to say how but rather only that such features
are essential, the idea is not developed in suﬃcient detail for our
purposes.
Lennox’s recent work on bios, on the other hand, which can be
seen as one way to develop the general idea that essence includes
habitat, does saymore about the relationship between a kind’s habi-
tat and its psychic activities. On Lennox’s interpretation, bios is the
‘single essential feature of organisms . . . that accounts for the in-
tegration of the many physical and functional diﬀerences that make
diﬀerent kinds of animals what they are’.Lennox argues that bios,
though not mentioned in works such as the Physics or in the metho-
dological discussions in Aristotle’s biological treatises, is given a
prominent role in bothHistory of Animals and Parts of Animals. In
the former it is one of the four main diﬀerentiae around which the
data Aristotle presents there are organized. And in Parts of Animals
it plays an ineliminable role in explaining why diﬀerent animals’
parts vary in particular ways. Strictly speaking, the character of the
body parts is teleologically explained by the functions they are used
to perform, but on Lennox’s interpretation a kind’s bios determines
what its vital functions have to be like. That latter role, according to
Lennox, is crucial to Aristotle’s scientiﬁc study of animal parts be-
cause Aristotle is acutely aware that explanations of individual parts
by reference to individual functions are not suﬃcient to explain the
survival and ﬂourishing of an organism. For the functions too must
be co-ordinated or integrated so that they all work together.By ap-
pealing to biosAristotle can explain ‘why a particular kind of animal
has just the set of functions it has’ and so can account for the unity
of an animal’s many activities and functions: Aristotle conceives of
a kind’s functions and activities as uniﬁed and co-ordinated by its
bios. Habitat, on this view, is related to a kind’s essential functions
 n. =Teleology,  n. ). ‘Watery’ animals, for instance, must feed in water.
However, the elemental constitution of a given region is not necessarily the same
as a habitat. The fact that something must eat ‘watery’ food does not entail that it
live in a marsh as opposed to, for example, a lake or seashore. For this reason, I do
not take the passages cited by Gotthelf (HA a–; Resp. ; PA a–; and
GC a) to be clear evidence that a kind’s elemental blend explains its having a
certain habitat.
 ‘Bios’, .
 See e.g. Lennox, ‘Bios’, –, and ‘Πρᾶξις’, : ‘The way of life of an animal
demands a coordination of the many “structure/function complexes” that make up
the animal. Without that coordination . . . you do not have an organism, i.e. a living
unity.’  Lennox, ‘Bios’, , and ‘Πρᾶξις’, .
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by being an aspect of a whole bios that determines what the kind’s
essential functions have to be like.
Lennox is certainly right to stress the importance, for Aristotle
and the modern biologist alike, of accounting not only for the
morphological ﬁt of parts to functions but also for the ﬁt between
functions. Moreover, scattered remarks that Aristotle makes sug-
gest that he takes himself to be addressing how the parts are
co-ordinated with one another, and not merely how the parts are
suited for particular functions. There are, however, two reasons
that might make one hesitate to accept Lennox’s interpretation.
First, it is not clear how this talk of ‘integrating’ and ‘co-
ordinating’ is supposed to be made precise, or what it means for
activities to be uniﬁed ‘due to’ the bios. Lennox’s language (‘ac-
counts for’, ‘explains’, ‘enforces coordination’, ‘demands’) suggests
a causal relation, and in particular the sort of causal and explanatory
relation that soul bears to an animal’s characteristic behaviours and
the functions of its parts. Lennox is clear, however, that he does
not think that a kind’s bios is equivalent to its soul or essence. And
he is clear that he does not think that a kind’s essential activities
are ‘due to’ the bios in the sense that they are for the sake of the
bios. But since it is neither a formal- nor a ﬁnal-causal relation, nor
presumably an eﬃcient- or material-causal relation, it is not clear
how this co-ordinating or integrating role is meant to correspond,
if at all, to the quadruple causal framework discussed in the Physics.
The nature of the causal and explanatory role that bios plays is,
then, somewhat elusive.
Second, as Lennox also notes, there are reasons to wonder how
such a complexway of life, with all itsmany aspects, can be a unitary
feature. This is problematic since, according to Lennox, Aristotle’s
motivation for introducing such a feature as bios was to provide
unity to the whole host of functions and activities that comprise
a living being’s soul or essence. But in order to do this unifying
work, the biosmust somehow form a unity itself. Given that a kind’s
bios involves so many diﬀerent things, it appears that we have just
pushed the question back to one about the ‘unity of the diverse fea-
tures of the animal’s way of life’.
These obstacles to accepting Lennox’s interpretation, though not
trivial, are not insurmountable. My interests are more narrowly de-
limited here, however, and so I would like instead to explore an-
 Lennox, ‘Πρᾶξις’, .
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other option for construing the relationship between habitat and
essential psychic activities that could be compatible with, though it
does not require, the stronger view advocated by Lennox.
An alternative way to pursue the same general strategy—i.e. the
strategy that builds habitat into the essence by assigning it a role in
determining what a kind’s essential functions and activities must be
like—would be to ﬁll in the details as follows. Since a kind’s essence
is identiﬁed with soul, which is a set of capacities for engaging in
vital activities, we can think about essences in terms of sets of capa-
cities. Capacities, moreover, can be considered at varying levels of
generality. For instance, pastry chefs and barbecue masters both
have the general capacity to cook food. However, they each have
that capacity in diﬀerent, more speciﬁc ways. One has the pastry-
chef cooking capacity, the other has the barbecue-master cooking
capacity. What determines the precise character of their respective
capacities are factors such as where and on what ingredients the
capacities are exercised. That is, their capacities are diﬀerent in vir-
tue of diﬀerences in the medium in which their capacities are exer-
cised (oven vs. grill) and diﬀerences in the objects upon which they
are exercised (ﬂour, butter, sugar vs. meat). Similarly, birds share
a general capacity to walk. However, walking in a marsh and walk-
ing on rocky cliﬀs are very diﬀerent activities. The speciﬁc form of
walking exhibited by the crane, for example, will diﬀer from that of
a falcon in virtue of particular features of the habitat—the marsh—
in which the crane’s walking occurs.
Habitat, according to this proposal, gets into the essence by
serving as a determinant of the precise way in which organisms
have their vital capacities. Marsh-dweller birds, for instance, are
 Just to be clear, the genus–species relationship that obtains between the general
capacity to walk and the species of walking exhibited by the marsh-dweller is not to
be construed as one that treats ‘marsh-dweller’ as a diﬀerentia of the general capa-
city. Not every genus–species relationship is one for which there is an independent,
extra feature that gets added to the genus to yield a new species. A bird is a speciﬁc
way of being an animal, but a bird is not animal+some diﬀerentia; a bird is a deter-
minate way of being an animal. Just so, being a marsh-dweller bird is not being a
bird+some diﬀerentia; being a marsh-dweller is a determinate way of being a bird.
For a helpful discussion of this contrast between diﬀerent kinds of genus–species
relationships see A. Ford, ‘Action and Generality’, in A. Ford, J. Hornsby, and F.
Stoutland (eds.), Essays on Anscombe’s Intention (Cambridge, Mass., ), –
at –. In Ford’s terminology, I take the speciﬁc capacities to stand in ‘categorial’
genus–species relationships to the general ones.
 An organism’s natural habitat cannot, of course, be the only thing serving
to determine how the organism has its capacities. There are likely to be several
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not just birds with certain capacities that happen to be exercised
best in marshes. Marsh-dweller birds are birds that have those
capacities in the marsh-dweller way. That is, ‘the marsh-dweller
way’ is a speciﬁcation of the way the organism has its vital capa-
cities.
According to this understanding of the relation between essential
capacities and habitat, it is natural to read Aristotle’s references to
organisms’ habitats as references to the speciﬁc or determinate way
they have their vital capacities, such as locomotion. For instance,
‘marsh-dweller way of life’ is, onmy proposal, a reference to theway
the bird has its essential vital capacities—in the marsh-dweller way.
Consequently, when Aristotle claims that being a marsh-dweller
is the cause of some birds having long legs (at PA . , b,
cited above), he is giving a teleological explanation. It is not that the
marsh-dweller birds have long legs for the sake of being in marshes.
Rather, they have long legs for the sake of exercising their distinc-
tive capacities, such as their capacity to walk in a certain way. And
that Aristotle takes himself to be giving a teleological explanation in
this passage is evinced by his commenting in the very next sentence
that ‘nature makes the instruments to ﬁt the function, not the func-
tion to ﬁt the instruments’ (b–). It is for the sake of walking
in a certain way—the way a marsh-dweller bird must walk—that
those birds have long legs.
. ‘External’ conditions and capacities
In case one is sceptical about including spatially external elements
in the essence of a living being, Aristotle’s account of perception
provides a useful model. Aristotle thinks that perceptual organs,
such as eyes, are deﬁned by the perceptual capacities they are for.
And perceptual capacities are essentially deﬁned by reference to
their proper external objects. To understand what an eye is, you
must know what sight is. To know what sight is, you must know
that it is of colour. Similarly, hearing is of sounds, and taste of ﬂa-
vours (DA . , a–). Not only is this an example of Aris-
determinants. Otherwise, all organisms in a certain habitat would have their essen-
tial capacities in the same way, which they do not.
 I owe thanks to Eve Rabinoﬀ for suggesting perception as a model for the way
that something ‘external’ gets to be ‘internal’.
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totle building something spatially external into the speciﬁcation of
a capacity, but his account of perceptual capacities also exempli-
ﬁes how something external can determine the precise character of
a capacity. For the nature of a perceptual capacity’s proper object
determines what that capacity has to be like, though not by being an
eﬃcient cause (as external objects are eﬃcient causes of perceptual
episodes). Rather, given that the objects are a certain way, some-
thing can be a perceiver only if it has organs with powers that stand
in the right relation to the character of those objects. A sighted eye,
for instance, has the power or capacity to see, and this power it has,
Aristotle says, is a certain ratio. This is because colour, the per
se object of vision, is a certain ratio of light to dark. This explains
why plants do not perceive: they do not have a mean (mesotēs)—the
proper ratio—and so cannot be receptive of the form of a sensible
object (e.g. the form of a colour, which is a certain ratio) without
the matter. So there is a quite clear sense in which the capacity to
see is what it is in virtue of its objects being what they are.
Aristotle’s account of perception, then, shows us how the object
of a capacity determines what the capacity is like. In addition, it
exempliﬁes how the context in which a capacity is exercised does
so as well. For there is a further feature of Aristotle’s account of
perception that is relevant to this discussion, namely, the medium
in which perceptual capacities are exercised. Vision, hearing, and
smell are, essentially, capacities for doing certain things or being af-
fected in certain ways under certain conditions, e.g. in a transparent
medium. And the ways that organisms have their perceptual capaci-
ties will be diﬀerent in diﬀerent media. For example, some animals
smell in water and some smell in air. Both water-dwellers and land-
dwellers have the same capacity to smell, Aristotle says, but they
smell in diﬀerent media and so have it in diﬀerent ways.One does
so by breathing, which is analogous to opening one’s eyelids, and
the other perceives smell in the watery medium directly. The me-
dium is not merely the ‘enabling’ condition for the exercise of an or-
ganism’s perceptual capacities: the character of the medium aﬀects
 DA . , a–: ‘perception is like a certain ratio [μεσότητα] between oppo-
sites among the perceptibles. And on account of this it discerns the perceptibles. For
the mean [μέσον] is able to discern [κριτικόν].’ See also DA . , a ﬀ.
 Thanks to Joel Yurdin for helpful discussions about this.
 See De sensu , b–. Since both kinds of organisms perceive odours—the
per se objects of smell—they both have this perceptive power, ‘but perhaps not in
the same way’ (ἀλλ ᾿ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἴσως τρόπον).
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the nature of the capacity. Analogously, on my account, habitats are
not merely external or enabling conditions under which organisms
exercise vital capacities: the character of the habitat is built into the
speciﬁcation of the particular way the kind has its vital capacities.
. Natural changes
The way that Aristotle’s account of perception builds spatially ex-
ternal features into the speciﬁcation of the capacities is helpful, I
have suggested, in showing the plausibility of the interpretation I
am oﬀering. As is the case with perception, specifying what any
other vital capacity is must include spatially external factors, such
as habitat. As I will now discuss, the analogy with perception is
also helpful in shedding important light on certain philosophical
and methodological assumptions in Aristotle’s scientiﬁc practices.
It follows from the way I have been suggesting that Aristotle con-
ceives of the relationship between an organism’s habitat and its es-
sence that the nature of a living organism, and the changes that are
due to that nature, cannot be understood in abstraction from the
context in which it essentially belongs. Just as one can make sense
of the changes and activities that constitute the life of an organism
only when understood in the context of an entire life cycle, and not
when viewed at a single moment in time, those changes and activi-
ties will make sense only when considered in the light of the condi-
tions that are essentially implicated in them. Living substances are
what they are partially in virtue of the spatially external factors that
living substances have the capacities on which to act and by which
to be aﬀected. Consequently, in so far as natural science aims to
understand those changes and activities that constitute the lives of
 This is not the place to embark on a full discussion of Aristotle’s comments in
MetaphysicsΘ , but scholars have taken him to be asserting there something like the
view that enabling conditions are not external to but deﬁnitive of the capacity they
enable. It is identiﬁed as the ‘more interesting reading’ of two ways of understanding
b–a, discussed by S. Makin, Aristotle: Metaphysics Book Theta (Ox-
ford, ),  ﬀ. Similarly, J. Moline states that Aristotle ‘conceives of the force
of a true capacity claim as being narrowly circumscribed by the circumstances under
which the capacity in question is in fact manifested. He thinks of what some would
call “external interferences” not as limitations upon the exercise of a capacity which
one possesses in any case; rather he conceives of them as circumscribing and deﬁning
more narrowly the capacity itself, as refuting inexact conceptions of the capacity in
question’ (J. Moline, ‘Provided Nothing External Interferes’,Mind,  (), –
 at ). See alsoT. Johansen,The Powers of Aristotle’s Soul (Oxford, ), –.
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living organisms, it is the business of a natural scientist to study liv-
ing organisms in their natural habitats.
The requirement that living organisms be studied in their na-
tural habitats has far-reaching implications for our assessment of
Aristotle’s practices in his natural science. It has been alleged to
be a weakness of Aristotle’s natural science that it does not con-
sider the changes an organism might undergo when removed from
its habitat—including changes in its behaviour—to be ones that ex-
hibit its nature or essence. Solely what an organism does in its na-
tural setting is thought to manifest its essence. His view has been
contrasted unfavourably with our current belief that an organism’s
changes in all types of circumstances, not merely its usual or typical
ones, are ‘equally natural to it’.Waterlow has criticized Aristotle’s
exclusive focus on what an organism does in its natural habitat as
follows:
What more understandable for a virtual pioneer in natural philosophy than
to assume that the natures of things can be read oﬀ from such changes
alone, and to consign all other reactions to the category of the ‘incidental’,
as reﬂecting nothing intrinsic in the objects that suﬀer them, but only the
tendency of an interfering force? . . . But a notion with plausible illustra-
tions is not necessarily a coherent concept capable of actual instantiation,
and we may well doubt the sense, as well as the scientiﬁc usefulness, of a
view which obliges us to identify the changes natural to a given object with
a mere sub-class of those occurring in it through perfectly natural causes.
As Waterlow sees it, Aristotle’s failure to consider the changes that
take place in non-typical circumstances as natural is an unfortunate
consequence of his metaphysical views about natural substances.
Natural substances diﬀer from artefacts in that they have natures—
‘inner principles of change and rest’—and so can be the sources
of their own changes. This implies that although external factors
might play a role in determining whether or not some change oc-
curs in an organism, they have no part to play in shaping the char-
acter of the change, according to Waterlow. This leads Aristotle
to ignore the inﬂuence that non-typical conditions exert on an or-
ganism’s changes, Waterlow claims, since those conditions would
have no bearing on the kinds of changes of which an organism’s
nature can be the source. If he were to allow external conditions to
shape or determine organisms’ natural changes, according to Wa-
 Waterlow,Nature, .  Waterlow,Nature, .
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terlow’s diagnosis, it would threaten their status as causally auto-
nomous substances with internal principles of change:
If the nature of a natural substance is exhibited in the changes whose char-
acter it autonomously determines, then in these changes the only role left
to the external conditions is that of permitting the change or not hinder-
ing it. It follows that if the conditions do hinder it, the resulting situation,
whether it is a new change or quiescent state, does not exhibit the substan-
tial nature.
And this conclusion—that changes in diﬀerent conditions do not
exhibit a kind’s nature—is a mistake, according to Waterlow. For,
as she points out, surely the changes an organism undergoes in all
sorts of circumstances are equally changes that are natural for it.
I agree that Aristotle thinks the changes an organism undergoes
outside of its natural habitat do not exhibit its essential nature. But
I disagree about the relationship natural habitat stands in to es-
sence, and so disagree that this is a mistake for Aristotle. I think
that Aristotle is viewing habitats as partially constitutive of essen-
tial capacities, rather than merely the background conditions that
might permit or hinder their exercise. Accordingly, since it is part
of the essence of a kind to dwell in certain habitats, the idea that its
changes in alternative circumstances do not exhibit its nature is not
a naïve mistake, but rather a substantive thesis.
If I am correct, Aristotle has every reason to think that what or-
ganisms do in their habitats constitutes changes that reveal their
essences, and what they do in other situations does not. Attending
once again to the parallels with perception helps us to see why this is
so. For an organism’s capacities are related to its natural habitat in
the way that a sighted eye’s power to see is related to the transpar-
ent medium in which it exercises that power. The changes that an
eye undergoes in the absence of a transparent medium are, surely,
changes that are possible for it. However, not every change that it is
possible for something to undergo is one for which it has an essential
capacity, and only those changes which are the exercises of essential
capacities can reveal its essence.Given that Aristotle thinks vision
 Waterlow,Nature, .
 Waterlow, Nature, : ‘But it is surely a crude mistake to think that an object’s
unitary nature is manifested only in behaviour of a single observable pattern.’
 This line of thought is in the spirit of suggestions made by A. D. P. Mourela-
tos, ‘Aristotelian Powers and Modern Empiricism’, Ratio,  (), –, about
Aristotle’s conception of capacities that are constitutive of a φύσις.
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essentially takes place in a transparent medium, a sighted eye in the
dark is not performing its essential function. Since an eye in the
dark is not doing what it is of the essence of an eye to do, whatever
it does is not revealing anything about its essential nature or func-
tion. And it is the eye’s essential nature or function that Aristotle, in
trying to understand the natural world, is concerned to understand.
Similarly, an organism outside of its natural habitat will undergo
various changes and may very well survive, but it is not living the
life distinctive of its kind. Those things that it can do in alternative
habitats are not, for Aristotle, capacities constitutive of its essen-
tial nature, any more than what an eye can do in the dark is among
the eye’s essential capacities. An eye in the dark is not exercising
some other capacity that it has; it is trying, and failing, to exercise
its perceptual capacity. So too, a ﬁsh ﬂopping on the shore is not
exercising some other locomotive capacity; it is trying, and failing,
to exercise its capacity to swim.
Just to be clear, knowing what an eye does in the dark can be use-
ful in an investigation of eyes, of course. And it is certainly the case
that Aristotle thinks that what we observe organisms doing outside
of their habitats is relevant to scientiﬁc enquiry. For instance, the
fact that ﬁsh choke out of water (as Aristotle reports) is useful in a
scientiﬁc investigation into their distinctive way of cooling them-
selves (with water, through gills). This bit of data is, in fact, em-
ployed by Aristotle to refute the view that ﬁsh respire by drawing
air from the surrounding water (Resp. , b ﬀ.). Although it is
relevant for a natural scientist to know that a ﬁsh chokes out of wa-
ter, a ﬁsh has no essential capacity to do this. Choking out of water
does not reveal the ﬁsh’s essence or exhibit its nature.
Thinking that how a creature behaves in other habitats does not
reveal its essence is a mistake only if one thinks of habitats as simply
background conditions that permit or hinder a kind’s essence to be
realized. If instead, as I have argued, it can be essential to natural
substances that they perform their vital activities in certain habi-
tats, trying to learn about the nature of those organisms by seeing
what they do outside of their habitats would be like trying to learn
about an eye in pitch darkness.
Thus Aristotle’s refusal to consider what organisms do in non-
natural settings as changes that reveal their essences, if the proposal
argued for here is correct, is justiﬁed. A human living outside of a
polis is either ‘worse or greater than human’ (Pol. . , a–),
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and it is a human life that Aristotle cares about understanding. A
ﬂourishing human life, Aristotle thinks, essentially involves living
in a certain sort of habitat. The same goes for other living beings.
. Conclusion
I began by observing that Aristotle is aware of the advantageous
ﬁts between organisms and their natural habitats. It would be sur-
prising if he thought this to be coincidental, given how vehemently
he insists that beneﬁcial arrangements of parts within organisms
cannot be merely lucky coincidences. And it would not only be sur-
prising: it runs counter to the way Aristotle talks about beneﬁcial
correlations between organisms and where they dwell. For instance,
he says that ‘residents by seas and rivers and lakes include all the
web-footed; for nature itself seeks what is suitable’ (HA  (). ,
a–).
This comment indicates that for Aristotle it is ‘nature itself ’ that
ensures the ﬁt between web-footed creatures and living near water.
But this is ambiguous. It is possible to read this as claiming that, as
a view such as Sedley’s would have it, a global nature is responsible
for the ﬁt. And it is also possible to read this as claiming that the in-
dividual natures of the sea, river, and lake residents are responsible,
perhaps because they can respond to their environments by forming
webbed feet. But neither of these readings is attractive. As I argued,
in order to make an appeal to global teleology provide a satisfying
answer, the view that there is a cosmic nature must be attributed
to Aristotle, which is controversial. And an attempt at an answer
running from environmental factors to the organisms’ parts can be
successful only if the environment can cause changes to the essen-
tial functions those parts are needed to perform. Yet that requires
some notion of adaptation over time, which appears to conﬂict with
Aristotle’s view that kinds are ﬁxed and eternal.
What I proposed instead is that Aristotle considers a kind’s na-
tural habitat to be built into the character of its essential capacities.
As I read that remark inHistory of Animals, he is claiming that the
natures of those sea-, river-, and lake-dwellers are responsible for
their useful webbed feet, just in the way that the natures of humans
are responsible for humans having the arrangement of teeth that we
do. So, I think we should not hear comments about the habitat in
Created on 26 February 2015 at 21.24 hours page 290
Aristotle on Essence and Habitat 
which an organism lives as references merely to the ‘arena’ in which
an animal exercises its capacities, but rather as elliptical references
to those vital capacities that are constitutive of their being the kinds
of organisms that they are.
If we take on board this suggestion about how to conceive of an
organism’s habitat in relation to its vital capacities, the answer to
questions of ﬁt is obvious and trivial. For now the form of our ques-
tion is not ‘Why are birds that have these parts and natural capaci-
ties so well suited to living in marshes?’, but rather ‘Why are birds
that have their natural capacities in the marsh-dweller way so well
suited to living in marshes?’. And asking that latter sort of question
is like asking why swimmers are so well suited to moving in water,
or why it is colour that vision perceives. As questions about how
the parts of a swimmer’s body ﬁt together, or about the structure of
the eye, these are perfectly ﬁne questions, and ones for which Aris-
totle has answers. But if these are questions about the ﬁt between a
certain sort of movement (swimming) and where it is exercised, or
about why perception is of perceptibles, I think we would not ask
them. So, if I am right that Aristotle thinks an organism’s habitat is
built into its essence, this is exactly how he would hear questions of
ﬁt, and thus it is unsurprising that he never raises them. For those
are questions that Aristotle would have considered absurd, just as he
thought it absurd to ask ‘why the curable, whenmoved and changed
qua curable, progresses towards health and not towards whiteness’
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